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Request channels in an orderly way :).

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Allow transmission on a certain channel (still retaining old interface).
Indentation changes.


git-svn-id: svn://svn.code.sf.net/p/rdesktop/code/trunk/rdesktop@411 423420c4-83ab-492f-b58f-81f9feb106b5
This commit is contained in:
Erik Forsberg 2003-06-06 11:07:46 +00:00
parent 5f9d3feb42
commit d612e591e1
1 changed files with 47 additions and 19 deletions
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66
secure.c
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@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern BOOL encryption;
extern BOOL g_licence_issued; extern BOOL g_licence_issued;
extern BOOL use_rdp5; extern BOOL use_rdp5;
extern int server_bpp; extern int server_bpp;
extern uint16 mcs_userid;
static int rc4_key_len; static int rc4_key_len;
static RC4_KEY rc4_decrypt_key; static RC4_KEY rc4_decrypt_key;
@ -340,9 +341,9 @@ sec_init(uint32 flags, int maxlen)
return s; return s;
} }
/* Transmit secure transport packet */ /* Transmit secure transport packet over specified channel */
void void
sec_send(STREAM s, uint32 flags) sec_send_to_channel(STREAM s, uint32 flags, uint16 channel)
{ {
int datalen; int datalen;
@ -364,9 +365,18 @@ sec_send(STREAM s, uint32 flags)
sec_encrypt(s->p + 8, datalen); sec_encrypt(s->p + 8, datalen);
} }
mcs_send(s); mcs_send_to_channel(s, channel);
} }
/* Transmit secure transport packet */
void
sec_send(STREAM s, uint32 flags)
{
sec_send_to_channel(s, flags, MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL);
}
/* Transfer the client random to the server */ /* Transfer the client random to the server */
static void static void
sec_establish_key(void) sec_establish_key(void)
@ -389,8 +399,16 @@ sec_establish_key(void)
static void static void
sec_out_mcs_data(STREAM s) sec_out_mcs_data(STREAM s)
{ {
uint16 num_channels = get_num_channels();
int hostlen = 2 * strlen(hostname); int hostlen = 2 * strlen(hostname);
int length = 158 + 76 + 12 + 4 + 20; int length = 158 + 76 + 12 + 4 + (CHANNEL_TAGDATA_SIZE * num_channels);
uint16 i;
rdp5_channel *channel;
if (0 < num_channels)
{
length += +4 + 4;
}
if (hostlen > 30) if (hostlen > 30)
hostlen = 30; hostlen = 30;
@ -467,12 +485,20 @@ sec_out_mcs_data(STREAM s)
out_uint32_le(s, encryption ? 0x3 : 0); /* encryption supported, 128-bit supported */ out_uint32_le(s, encryption ? 0x3 : 0); /* encryption supported, 128-bit supported */
out_uint32(s, 0); /* Unknown */ out_uint32(s, 0); /* Unknown */
out_uint16_le(s, SEC_TAG_CLI_CHANNELS); DEBUG_RDP5(("num_channels is %d\n", num_channels));
out_uint16_le(s, 20); /* length */ if (0 < num_channels)
out_uint32_le(s, 1); /* number of virtual channels */ {
out_uint8p(s, "cliprdr", 8); /* name padded to 8(?) */ out_uint16_le(s, SEC_TAG_CLI_CHANNELS);
out_uint16(s, 0); out_uint16_le(s, num_channels * CHANNEL_TAGDATA_SIZE + 4 + 4); /* length */
out_uint16_le(s, 0xc0a0); /* Flags. Rumours tell this is documented in MSDN. */ out_uint32_le(s, num_channels); /* number of virtual channels */
for (i = 0; i < num_channels; i++)
{
channel = find_channel_by_num(i);
DEBUG_RDP5(("Requesting channel %s\n", channel->name));
out_uint8p(s, channel->name, 8);
out_uint32_be(s, channel->channelflags);
}
}
s_mark_end(s); s_mark_end(s);
} }
@ -563,7 +589,7 @@ sec_parse_crypt_info(STREAM s, uint32 * rc4_key_size,
if (end > s->end) if (end > s->end)
return False; return False;
in_uint32_le(s, flags); /* 1 = RDP4-style, 0x80000002 = X.509 */ in_uint32_le(s, flags); /* 1 = RDP4-style, 0x80000002 = X.509 */
if (flags & 1) if (flags & 1)
{ {
DEBUG_RDP5(("We're going for the RDP4-style encryption\n")); DEBUG_RDP5(("We're going for the RDP4-style encryption\n"));
@ -673,15 +699,16 @@ sec_process_crypt_info(STREAM s)
} }
DEBUG(("Generating client random\n")); DEBUG(("Generating client random\n"));
/* Generate a client random, and hence determine encryption keys */
// This is what the MS client do: // This is what the MS client do:
memset(inr, 0, SEC_RANDOM_SIZE); memset(inr, 0, SEC_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* *ARIGL!* Plaintext attack, anyone? /* *ARIGL!* Plaintext attack, anyone?
I tried doing: I tried doing:
generate_random(inr); generate_random(inr);
..but that generates connection errors now and then (yes, ..but that generates connection errors now and then (yes,
"now and then". Something like 0 to 3 attempts needed before a "now and then". Something like 0 to 3 attempts needed before a
successful connection. Nice. Not! successful connection. Nice. Not!
*/ */
generate_random(client_random); generate_random(client_random);
if (NULL != server_public_key) if (NULL != server_public_key)
@ -775,7 +802,8 @@ sec_recv(void)
if (sec_flags & SEC_LICENCE_NEG) if (sec_flags & SEC_LICENCE_NEG)
{ {
if (sec_flags & SEC_ENCRYPT) { if (sec_flags & SEC_ENCRYPT)
{
DEBUG_RDP5(("Encrypted license detected\n")); DEBUG_RDP5(("Encrypted license detected\n"));
} }
licence_process(s); licence_process(s);
@ -809,7 +837,7 @@ sec_connect(char *server, char *username)
/* We exchange some RDP data during the MCS-Connect */ /* We exchange some RDP data during the MCS-Connect */
mcs_data.size = 512; mcs_data.size = 512;
mcs_data.p = mcs_data.data = (uint8*)xmalloc(mcs_data.size); mcs_data.p = mcs_data.data = (uint8 *) xmalloc(mcs_data.size);
sec_out_mcs_data(&mcs_data); sec_out_mcs_data(&mcs_data);
if (!mcs_connect(server, &mcs_data, username)) if (!mcs_connect(server, &mcs_data, username))